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CHIN A IN THE WAR
BY CARROLL K. MICHENER
T is generally conceded that at the beginning of the Great War the political
integrity of China, the commercial Open
Door, and the general peace of the Far East,
were most threatened. by two aggressors] apan and Russia. The first two years
of the war emphasized this danger. Two
notable recent events, however, have put a
radically different complexion on Far Eastern affairs, and placed the future of China
on a more promising basis than it has ever
stood before. These events are the democratization of Russia and the alignment of
China with the Allies in th~ir war against
Germany.
The significance of these happenings in
their relation to the affairs of the Far East
seems to have been more or less overlooked
in our intense preoccupation with the nearer
aspects of the war. But their effect must
be far-reaching, and eventually will be apparent, not only as shaping China's destiny,
but in the solution of the Orient's complex
problems.
The effect of the changes in Russia as they
touch China is, of course, subject only to
speculation, but the probable res_u lts of
China's entrance into the war seem so obvious as to wa'rrant pretty liberal estimation.
Both, it may be safely said, will have their
share in lifting China to a more powerful
·and honorable place among her sister nations.

I

PROBABLE GAINS FROM THE WAR

China stands to gain far more than she
might lose by the war. The balance is almost wholly in her favor. In it are to be
reckoned her hope of release from the staggering indemnities inherited from the Boxer
trouble, probable relief from foreign restrictions that keep her import duties at an unprofitable level, restoration of sovereignty
over territorial concessions wrested from her
in her greatest hours of weakness, more generous cooperation in developing her natural
resources, and a more certain guarantee of
her democracy and her political integrity.
Participation in the war gives China a
•double leverage for the attainment of the

last-named of these potential benefits. It
will operate both internally and externally.
The recent monarchical restoration of General Chang Hsun served to emphasize the
lack of cohesion that threatens China within. It was followed by continued rumblings
of southern secession, which persisted up to
the moment of declaring war on Germany.
At any time China might have burst into
the flame of a civil strife between the radical
South and the reactionary North. The facing of a national enemy should be, as always, a powerful agent for quieting this internal dissension and for putting China's
quarreling patriots shoulder to shoulder.
The external safeguard of the Chinese democracy resides, of course, in the benevolent
protection assured by the family of Allied
nations.
RUSSO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT

The danger to China's integrity from
predatory neighbors has been acute for over
a century. Though most of the European
powers have had their share in a policy of
plundering that seemed certain a decade and
a half ago to result in the "break-up of
China" that more than one authority on Far
Eastern affairs predicted, Russia and Japan
always have been the most threatening to
her political entity. Both are imperialistic.
The Russo-] apanese war was an incident
that outlined China's danger to the full,
though on the surface it may have seemed
a negative sort of protection to her. Out of
that comparatively indecisive struggle grew
recognition between Japan and Russia of
the compatibility-in spite of the similarity
of their imperialistic aims. They found that
cooperation, rather than altercation, was
what would best advance their mutual interests.
At the beginning of the Great War, then
-just ten years after the siege of Port Arthur-Japan and Russia had come to an
agreement that held the utmost danger for
China. Between them they had parceiled
out Manchuria and Mongolia, and agreed
upon harmonious means of exploiting their
spheres of influence. Russia retained in ef411
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feet what she had fought for in 1904-generous commercial advantage in China and
a sea outlet in the Eastern hemisphere. J apan insured what in effect she fought forand which nominally had been very largely
wrested from her by the treaty of Portsmouth-an outlet on the continent of Asia
for her surplus population, and plenty of
commercial elbow-room.
JAPAN'S OVERLORDS HIP

Enlargement of these advantages through
the Russo-] apanese rapprochement had been
observed by the other powers prior to the
Great War, and it is aoubtful if the process
could have gone to much greater length without an accounting. The war, however, and
the alignment of Japan and Russia in the
Entente group, removed all restraining
fingers. In wresting Kiaochow from Germany Japan took liberties with China's
sovereignty that seemed to evidence a feeling on her part that she was free to go almost as far as she liked. This apparent sentiment was demonstrated further in the famous twenty-one demands, and not many
months ago in the concessions insisted upon as indemnity for a petty clash between
Japanese military police and Chinese resident troops in northern China. Japan has
taken over in full Germany's former interests in China, and such of the twentyone demands as met with compliance have
given her vastly increased commercial and
political influence over h~r neighbor. The
result may be summed up, so far as China
is concerned, as the conversion of China into what gave ominous promise of a future
vassal state, and as the virtual overthrowso most observers in the United States have
viewed it-of the Open Door policy.
RUSSIAN POLICY

With imperialistic Japan in full agreement with imperialistic Russia, and the aims
of both in the Far East beng carried out
energetically by Japan during the fortuitous
"open season" occasioned by the occupation
of the rest of the powers in the world war,
the Russian revolution offered curiously new
possibilities. Would the sudden change from
autocracy to democracy effect changes in
Russia's policies that would reach as far as
China? Could the pronouncement of the
infant Muscovite democracy that it would
continue the war for liberties and not for
conquests be taken as an indication that the
new Russia would strive no further for em-

pire in the East? Might China not only
be safe from further territorial aggression
by her neighbor on the north, but even regain from the sister democracy what the old
autocacy had taken while China was in the
throes of her own emancipation? These
questions, of course, are not yet answered,
but they offer hopeful possibilities. They
are questions to which China's entrance into the war may insure the most satisfactory
answers.
China at war with Germany on the side
of the Allies is an astoundingly different figure from anything she has ever before presented to the modern world. Even though
her participation in the war may be only
nominal, her position would be hardly less
strong for that. It is the outcome of the
boldest and most farseeing bit of statecraft
the young republic has written into her history. In a word, she places herself and her
destiny at a council table the nature of which
insures to her oy moral force alone the justice and security she might otherwise have
gained only by recourse to arms against nations with which she now is allied.
WRITING OFF BOXER INDEMNITIES

The world at large scarcely realizes, perhaps, what a revenge is wreaked upon the
Chinese people through the staggering indemnities exacted in punishment for the
fanatical outburst of 1901. Though originally the Boxer indemnity reached a total
of only $335,000,000, it has grown through
deferred interest payments to almost twice
that sum. Many millions of the debt have
been paid, but the sum owing to-day is about
$550,000,000, which is an exceedingly heavy
burden for a nation whose annual budget
runs to scarcely more than $200,000,000.
Although Germany took small part in the
relief of the Boxer-besieged legation at
Peking, her troops arriving after everything
was over except the looting, her portion of
the indemnity was larger than that of any
other nation except Russia, whose troops did
least in the restoration of order. Germany's
shar.e was $110,000,000, most of which is
unpaid. Here, then, is an opportunity for
China to be rid promptly of one of the dangerous drains upon her financial vitals.
Declaration of war against Germany at once
strikes off a debt of a least a hundred odd
millions. As for the rest of the indemnity,
is it a vain hope that the reward of the Allies for China's enlistment in their cause
should be complete remission of payment, or ·
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at the very least an indefinite deferment as
to both principal and interest?
The example of the United States in converting her share of the indemnity into a
fund for the education of young Chinese in
schools and colleges of America has been
looked upon in late years by the other powers
with a respect almost amounting to Jealousy.
China counts upon this shrewd example,
doubtless, to bring equal, if not greater, concessions from the nations that now are her
allies. And if -the chancelleries of Europe
understand China-as they must pretty well
at this advanced stage of diplomatic experimenting upon her-they understand that it
is not the money alone that irks China; that
probably the money is the very least of the
burden. It is the ignominy undeservedly inherited from old China that stings the young
Chinese. The Boxer indemnity for them is
loss of "face"-a badge of servitude as bitter
as the shameful queue of the Tartars.

the foreign colonies planted on Chinese soil.
They have become more pernicious parasites
on China's sovereignty than ever Japan had
to deal with. Germany's seizure of Kiaochow was a flagrant example. Here as in
all the foreign concessions, was planted a
foreign flag, foreign courts, a foreign army.
From the firm entrenchment of Tsingtau,
Germany reached out by means of railroad
enterprises until practically the entire province of Shantung was in her grasp. This
was true to greater or less extent with all
the foreign concessions, each of which was
an open and spreading wound to China's
sovereignty. The British entrenched themselves at Hongkong and Wei-hai-wei, the
French in Kuangchouwan, the Portuguese
at Macao, the Japanese in Formosa and
Kuantung ; and each of these and other nations had gained smaller slices of territory in
nearly a dozen treaty ports up and down the
coast and far inland.

DISCRIMINATIONS AGAINST CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY

FOREIGN TROOPS AT PEKING

Increasing the weight of the indemnity
burden, the restricted import duty imposed
upon China by the meddling powers has
been another financial incubus. Though the
5 per cent. impost was fixed over a decade
ago, and even then was inadequate to meet
China's revenue needs, she never was able to
get the unanimous consent of all the powers
to increase it. China hopes, by entering the
war, to remedy not only this but other financial disabilities, and to gain release from
the more irksome of the fiscal supervision imposed upon her by creditor nations.
The young China has chafed sorely at her
inheritance of foreign police and law courts
from those recent barbaric days when they
admittedly were necessary. The outright
concessions or long-term leases of land for
trading purposes and as war indemnities,
some of them dating back over half a century, are severe thorns to-day in the side of
the young republic. What happened to the
foreign concessions many years ago in Japan
must happen in China eventually, but the
powers have not been noticeably disposed to
act on their own initiative. Their course
would have been to wait until China was
strong enough politically to compel restoration of her alienated soil to the sovereignty
of her own flag. This political strength
seems assured to her in the place she will
hold at the war council-table of the Allies.
Particularly humiliating have been some of
•

Most · exasperating to the young China of
all the extra-territoriality, perhaps, is the
presence, a decade and a half after the Boxer
uprising, of thousands of foreign troops under the very eaves of the gilded roofs of the
C'1.pital, guarding the legations and the line
of approach to the sea. The world had almost forgotten this arrangement in the recent
days when the dramatic burlesque of General
Chan's attempted restoration of the Manchu
dynasty suddenly called it to mind. It was
rather surprising to read the news cables that
chronicled renewed marches of protective
foreign troops along the railway leading
from Tien-Tsin to Peking. China would
have all this remedied, either by tacit agreement now or by promised council after the
war. She would have the flag of the republic
flying over all of China, · and her new law
courts and police power governing the foreigner as well as the native within her gates.
THE KAISER'S MAILED FIST IN CHINA

Opportunity for the seizure of Kiaochow,
which had long been contemplated, was afforded to the Kaiser by the murder of two
German missionaries in Shantung province.
The Berlin Government immediately instructed its minister at Peking to demand
of the Chinese Government the cession • of
Kiaochow Bay and its adjacent territory.
Before China had time to answer the German note, four German cruisers suddenly
appeared in Kiaochow Bay and landed a
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large detachment of marines. Since China
could not fight she could do no less than
sign the "murder convention." Though the
murders were the pretext, the real reason for
the seizure, of course, was that German
trade expansion in China demanded advantages no less great than those other European nations had acquired long before the
development of Germany's colonial policy.
Since the seizure of Kiaochow, China has
had occasion often enough to observe the
operation of the mailed fist. In treatment
both of officials and individuals-particularly
the common people who happened to be in
the way-Germany has been ruthless and arrogant. What China considered the greatest humiliation visited upon her as punishment for the Boxer uprising against foreigners was Germany's demand of an imposing monument in a conspicuous place in
Peking bearing a perpetual apology for the
murder of the German ambassador. Though
the German troops arrived late at the relief
of Peking, they were not too late for bloodshed and looting. Order had been restored,
but the German troops came inland to
Peking in a procession of sabotage and murder according with the orders for "frightfulness" that had gone out from Potsdam.
INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

As for a direct cause of war China
had, perhaps, less grievance than any other
belligerent. Having no commerce under her
flag on the high seas she has not suffered
greatly as a result of the German submarine
policy. She can point, however, to the loss
of two hundred Chinese lives on board a
British vessel torpedoed in the Mediterranean, and though China has not always
valued the lives of her citizens highly or
given even passable protect~on for them
abroad, she no doubt feels that as direct
causes of war go the loss of her two hundred would be ample.
But above all the impelling motives and
influences leading China into the struggle
stands doubtless the initiative of the United
States. The sympathy between these two
nations because of like ideals and fortuitous
policies of the United States that have bound
them together in spite of an occasional error,
is so well understood as to need no restatement. The leadership of America in political
ideals has been particularly pronounced during the period of the war leading up to the
United States' break with Germany. Utterances of the press and of official China in-

dicated throughout that the Far Eastern republic gave full endorsement to the war policies of the United States. President Wilson's note to neutrals at the time of the
break with Germany was a cue that China
picked up promptly. Without a "by-yourleave" to her self-appointed mentor, Japan,
China broke off relations with Germany as
the United States had done. There was
evident at the same time a disposition to go
even further, should the United States
again take the lead. In fact, not long after
America's declaration that a state of war
with Germany existed the Chinese cabinet
determined to follow suit. A quarrel with
Parliament over the right of initiative in the
matter blocked a formal declaration at that
time, although all parties are said to have
been agreed upon the wisdom of the war
policy.
1

jAPAN S RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA SHIFTED

TO THE ALLIES

In the future relations of Japan and
China as a result of China's participation in
the war, there is a field for interesting speculation. From this viewpoint alone, China
seems to have made a master play. There is
no doubt that China has feared Japan more
than any other nation. She has had cause for
such fear. Japan's modern armies have humbled her in military encounter, and Japan's
might everywhere and always has been
made apparent to China; for many years her
mailed fist, like Germany's, has been at
China's nose. Since the beginning of the
European war that fist has shaken more
ominously, and, bowing to the inevitable,
China long since began making the best she
could of the situation. The Tsingtau affair
added to her troubles because instead of being
relieved of one of the foreign aggressors upon her soil she merely experienced a change
of tenartts. Japan promises to be even a
sharper thorn at Tsingtau than was Germany. Not only at Kiaochow, but throughout China, commercially and politically, has
Japan appeared to be administering an active
tutorship leading further and further toward
virtual suzerainty.
But now, of a sudden, China puts a
totally new and interesting aspect on the
case by her entrance into the war. In
effect she transfers responsibility of maintaining political integrity from her own
shoulders to the collective shoulders of the
Allies. At one stroke she removes Japan
as chief arbiter of her destinies, and substi-
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The Allies, who were too busily at war,
and the United States, whose perplexities
at home and abroad made her seem indifferent to the fate of China, now are brought
back to their duty by a simple shuffling of
the cards-China's new deal.
RESTORATION OF THE OPEN DOOR

America's foreign policy, so far as we can
be said to have a policy concerning the Far
East, has been centered about the -Open
Door. With Germany's commercial interests in China after the war governed by
what doubtless will be the severe after-thewar commercial program of the Allies,
Japan will be the greatest gainer. Her
commercial future in China is assured. Removing Germany as a trade competitor in
the · Far East will relieve the commercial
pressure sufficiently, perhaps, to restore
automatically the Open Door which has appeared to be in great danger of being padlocked shut through the activities of Japan.
CHINA'S WEIGHT IN THE WAR

Curiously enough it will make no great
difference, in the strategic gains that will
result for China, whether she contributes
much or little in waging the war against
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Germany. Her aid will be largely in moral .
and potential force. Little if anything can
be expected of China in a military way.
She has no navy, and though there are in
China upwards of half a million men under
arms, they are neither trained nor equipped
for warfare of the sort that is waged at the
present day. As for men she has the greatest
store of any nation in the world. Perhaps
100,000 already have been sent to France to
replace in fields and factories the men needed
at the front. Doubtless many hundreds of
thousands more will go to fill similar industrial gaps in the ranks of the Allies.
China's natural resources are enormous.
Her coal and iron should be of immediate use
to the Allies. A single one of her iron mines,
in Hupeh province, will yield, it is estimated,
5,000,000 tons of ore. There are foundries
and smelters at Hanyang on the Yangtze
River that turn out 500,000 tons of steel annually. China's annual output of coal is only
about 6,000,000 tons, but she has coal resources of about 135,000 acres. The weight
of China as a belligerent, therefore, even
though she never fires a shot, and the ponderance of the questions she brings into due
course of solution at the end of the war, are
such as will bulk largely in the scales that
shall weigh the world's peace.

JAPAN, CHIN A, AND THE
FAR EAST
BY K. K. KAWAKAMI

T

HE year 1917 has been a year of puzzles at the very moment when Russia threw the
and surprises. -W ithin the first six imperial regime overboard.
months events as dramatic as they were unexJAPAN AND RUSSIA
pected followed one after another in such
rapid succession that even the extraordinary
In such sudden turns of events in Russia
three years that preceded them seem to have and China, Japan, responsible for the preserbecome comparatively commonplace. Since vation of peace in the Orient, while the
the dawn of the year we have seen the over- powers of the West are engaged in the titanic
throw of the Romanoff dynasty, followed by struggle, is perhaps more keenly interested
the advent of the new Republic of Russia. than any other country. Japan realizes the
We have also seen America breaking loose · seriousness of the responsibility she has asfrom her traditional foreign policy and deter- sumed in the Far East, and watches with the
mined to play an important role in the war gravest concern the developments of the
of Europe. To China, however, ci:edit is due situation in both Russia and China.
for having ' furnished the greatest of great
When I stopped at Tokio en route to
surprises. That country of eternal enigma Peking, the statesmen of Japan were frankly
has set the world agog by an attempt to re- puzzled as to the course their country might
vive the defunct Manchu dynasty, and this be called upon to take, should disorganization
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in Russia grow so disastrous as to compel her
to drop from the ranks of the Entente powers
and conclude a separate peace with Germany.
Japan, though six thousand miles distant
from Petrograd, is nevertheless 'Russia's
next-door ·neighbor, and is in a position to
bring pressure to bear upon the Muscovites
once they are inclined to secede from the
Entente camp. I was given to understand by
the statesmen I interviewed that should
Russia grasp Germany's hand and pursue a
common course with the latter Japan would,
if requested by her allies, throw her army
across the Japan Sea and compel Russia to
divert her forces from the European field of
battle to the Far East. But what would be
Japan's line of action in case Russia simply
stopped fighting against Germany and took
no aggressive steps against England and
France? To this question I was unable to
get any definite answer. All would perhaps
depend upon the disposition of the powers
with whom Japan is cooperating.
ACTIVE AID TO THE ALLIES

That the Terauchi Cabinet is willing to
aid England and France more than is required in the provisions of the AngloJapanese alliance is indicated by the great
activities of Japanese warships in the Mediterranean Sea as well as in the Indian Ocean
and the Red Sea. To emphasize that willingness Japan }ias even sent a special embassy
to America ostensibly for no other purpose
than that of assuring the latter nation that
she is ready to take care of the entii:e Pacific
Ocean if the American navy finds it necessary
to transfer its Pacific fleets to the Atlantic.
JAPAN'S ALTERED CHINESE POLICY

With the woe and weal of China, Japan's
concern is more direct. The slogan of the
Terauchi Cabinet with regard to that unfortunate country has been "Hands off
China!" The cabinet was indeed organized
to reverse the Chinese policy followed by its
predecessor, the Okuma ministry. The
Okuma Cabinet, perhaps misled by the illadvised counsel of the so-called China experts, made grave blunders in its dealings
with China. It resorted to doubtful means
in preventing Yuan Shih-kai's enthronement.
It presented to China the celebrated twentyone demands in a manner objectionable both
to China and the outside powers. Moreover,
some of those demands should better have
been withheld. To make the situation more
intolerable, the same ministry reopened the

wound it had already inflicted upon China
.by presenting fresh demands on the occasion
of the little fracas which took place between
Japanese and Chinese troops at Cheng-Chiatun, Manchuria. In fairness to Marquis
Okuma, I am willing to concede that he believed his Chinese policy to be the best that
could be found under the circumstances
which he had to contend with. Yet judged
from the results that policy was a grievous
failure.
"WATCHF U L WAITING" IN CHINA

There is no doubt that the Terauchi Cabinet is enjoying the fruits of the Chinese
measures for which Okuma and his colleagues had to shoulder all blame, for those
measures, despite their marring features, accomplished certain aims which Terauchi himself would have been called upon to accomplish, had they been left unattained by
Okuma.
After all has been said in favor of Okuma,
the fact remains that his Chinese policy has
created a situation which needs to be mended
by his successor. It is to this task of amelioration that Terauchi has been invited to address
.himself. And the new policy which Terauchi has inaugurated in response to this call is
a policy of "non-interference." Translated
into President Wilson's striking language,
Terauchi's policy in China is "watchful wait-
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ent cabinet has long since withdrawn eral ~
J apa!'lese troops from Cheng-Chia-tien. It is gentl~
even rumored that Terauchi is contemplating Hung
the removal of Japanese soldiers from Han- Thus
kow, where they have been stationed ever China
since the first Chinese revolution of 1911. As i
But the most noteworthy evidence of this off tn
non-interference policy is the attitude con• ernme
sistently taken by Count Terauchi and his the 4
Foreign Minister, Baron Motono, in the throui
political crisis in China apparently occa- at one
sioned by the question of · China's participa- vice t1
tion in the European war.
ance
China
CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR
ing w .
This last-named war question is, of course, had a]
quite• independent of the question of what to hav
governmental form China should adopt. But ther St
in China all foreign questions are, to the bility
jeopardy of the nation's welfare, ruthlessly the in
exploited by opposing factions for the ports
manipulation of internal politics. Viewed in presse 4
this light, the powers would have done well dema11
to advise China to let the war question alone.
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nable even to take care of her own affairs,
..,hina is in no position to tamper with such
\uestions. I fail to understand those Amerins who are very boastful of their successful
fforts to induce China to sever diplomatic
lations with Germany. Do they not know
at they were playing with fire which might
nsume China's own tottering structure?
To clear the atmosphere befogged by indis,riminate writings, it is essential to underand Japan's position with regard to Chiese participation in the war. It w'as in 1915,
hen Yuan Shih-kai was still enjoying dicta:orial power, that the idea of drawing China
jnto the war was broached by England. At
hat moment Japan could not see her way to
upport the idea, for the obvious reason that
uan was eager to go to war merely to
ortify his own position as a step towards the
imperial throne he had been coveting. Japan
as convinced that Yuan's accession would
oon be followed by more rebellions, and was
anxious to prevent such a consummation.
ngland herself eventually adopted the same
iew of the situation, and the matter of
hinese participation in the war was for the
ime dropped.
When in March last America severed
diplomatic intercourse with Germany and
advised China to follow suit, the political
situation in China had so radically changed
that Japan was now willing to let China act
in consonance with the American advice.
The dictatorial Yuan had been dead for several months, and in his place an amicable
entleman in the person of General Li YuanHung was occupying the presidential chair.
Thus Japan's main reason for objecting to
China's taking part in the war· was removed.
As soon as America advised China to break
off treaty relations with Germany, the government at Peking asked Japan's opinion on
the question.
The Terauchi Cabinet,
through Foreign Minister Motono, replied
at once that it was reluctant to give any advice that might be interpreted as an interferance with China's own affairs, but that
China would perhaps lose nothing in breaking with Germany, especially when America
had already taken that course and was eager
to have China line up with her. China further sought Japan's opinion as to the advisability of asking the consent of the powers to
the increase of the customs tariff on the imports to China. In reply to this Japan expressed herself ready to accede to such a
demand, provided, of course, other powers
Oct.- 6
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would act likewise. I have reason to believe
that Japan even suggested that China at once
notify the powers with a view to securing the
desired revision of the tariff.
Such has been Japan's unequivocal attitude towards China's war question. He
speaks ill-advisedly who tells Americans that
China hesitated to follow the example set by
the United States and close the doors against
Germany because she was fearful of Japan's
objection to such a step.
Both the American and the Japanese
press have discussed with a great deal of
animation the American note presented to
China on June 7, urging upon President Li
Yuan-hung the necessity of establishing a
government capable of restoring peace and
order before China could decide upon war.
I am inclined to believe that Japan will not
long be permitted to follow a policy of noninterference in China. If the chaotic situation in China persists, even after the termination of the European war, other powers
are certain to intervene, or at least clamor for
the restoration of order. The American advice to China given in March and June has
already sounded a warning in the ears of the
Japanese. Should European nations, after
the war, each essay to take a hand in Chinese
affairs, might not Japan also be obliged to
deviate from her present policy?
REPUBLIC OR MONARCHY IN CHINA?

That a stable government will not easily
be established in China goes without saying.
The political chaos will not end with the
fiasco created by General Chang Hsun's
fatuous attempt to resuscitate the Manchu
dynasty dead for six years. What will be
China's ultimate form of government no one
can tell. Such influential men as Tuan
Chi-Jui, Hsu Shi-Chang, and Feng KuoChang no doubt see in a constitutional monarchy the best form of government for China,
but even they realize that the Manchu
dynasty cannot be restored. Where, then,
shall they loo~ for the imperial timber? On
the other hand, Sun Yat-Sen and his Southern associates believe in out-and-out republicanism, which will never be accepted by the
orthern leaders.
To an unbiased observer, it would seem
that China's only hope for rehabilitation lay
in mutual concessions on the part of the radical South and the conservative North, thus
finding a common ground upon which to
establish a government.

BENEFITS TO CHINA
By CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER
(Judge of the United States Court for China)
ARTICIPATION in the war was a
P
subject of controversy in China long before it was actually undertaken, and indeed
was one of the causes leading to the crisis
which incidentally made possible the shortlived Manchu restoration of last July. Those
who favored such participation argued that
it would give China a recognized place at the
peace conference and enable her to secure
two important and long-sought concessions,
vi.: ( 1 ) the remission, or at least suspension,
of the so-called "Boxer" indemnities, and
(2) a substantial increase of customs duties.
As to -the first, our own Government long
ago recognized the justice of the claim by
remitting its entire share of the Boxer indemnity; and this was done not as a mere
act of generosity, but as one of justice. In
other words, our representatives became convinced after investigation that the sum exacted from China by the powers in 1900 was
more than reimbursement for losses actually
suffered by them, and amounted to a fine
imposed upon a then helpless nation.
As to the second concession sought, it will
no doubt surprise the ordinary reader to
learn that China must obtain the consent
of the Powers in order to increase her customs duties. This is because that branch
of her public service, while technically
Chinese, is really administered by foreigners
(i. e., non-Chinese) in order to insure payment of interest on China's foreign loans.
Indeed, it would hardly be inaccurate to
say that the Chinese customs service is a
creation of foreigners. The late Sir Robert
Hart devoted his life to it; and while the
treaties require that the Inspector General
shall be a British subject for some years to
come, representatives of other nationalities,
including our own, have contributed materially to its upbuilding and successful administration. Men like Morse and Merrill, now
retired, as well as Carl and Bryant, still in
the harness, have worthily represented our
country in a branch of China's governmental
service which has been honestly arid efficiently
administered, and which, with the "Salt Gabelle," or monopoly, similarly operated, af418

fords an important, if not the principal,
source of China's public revenues.
But the control of the Powers extends
to the fixing of the amount of duty, and at
present this is only 5 per cerit. Considering
that the gravest obstacles of the Chinese government in recent years have been financial
ones, it is not strange that its officials have
looked to the customs as a source of relief
and have regarded the present limitation as
not only entirely too low, but as framed in
the interests of foreign exporters rather than
in those of the Chinese people. Moreover,
those foreign representatives who have been
most insistent up01. retaining the so-called
indemnity are also the ones who oppose an
increase of duties; and to the Chinese, it
seems the extreme of injustice to be forced on
the one hand to pay these heavy exactions and
on the other to be denied the full benefit of a
legitimate source of revenue to meet them.
As to · these points, therefore, China's case
appears to be entirely just and reasonable
and at the same time quite in line with traditional American policy. To what extent
she will participate actively in the war which
she has now voluntarily entered remains to
be seen; but it is not unlikely that her most
effective contribution will be labor. I may
cite as ari earnest of this the fact that the
ship which brought me recently from China
to America carried nearly a thousand Chinese
laborers for the western front, entraining at
Vancouver for the rail trip across Canada
and thence transsshipirig to France. Largelimbed and brawny, these coolies were the
pick of Shantung Province; and it is safe
to say that for trench digging and all the
heaviest work of warfare each is better fitted
than the average soldier. It is interesting
to note also that the plan works well for
the coolie, affording him better wages, food,
and clothing than he would have at home
and insuring provision likewise for his family in China. This augmentation of Allied
resources has now been in progress for months
and may prove a not inconsiderable factor
toward that victorious outcome of the
for which .w e of America are hoping.
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